Machine learning based intrusion detection system for software defined networks by Abubakar, Atiku & Pranggono, Bernardi
Machine learning based intrusion detection system for 
software defined networks
ABUBAKAR, Atiku and PRANGGONO, Bernardi <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-
2992-697X>
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/16558/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
ABUBAKAR, Atiku and PRANGGONO, Bernardi (2017). Machine learning based 
intrusion detection system for software defined networks. In: Proceedings of the 
2017 Eighth International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies (EST). 
IEEE. (In Press) 
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
Abstract —Software-Defined Networks (SDN) is an emerging area 
that promises to change the way we design, build, and operate 
network architecture. It tends to shift from traditional network 
architecture of proprietary based to open and programmable 
network architecture. However, this new innovative and improved 
technology also brings another security burden into the network 
architecture, with existing and emerging security threats. The 
network vulnerability has become more open to intruders: the 
focus is now shifted to a single point of failure where the central 
controller is a prime target. Therefore, integration of intrusion 
detection system (IDS) into the SDN architecture is essential to 
provide a network with attack countermeasure. The work 
designed and developed a virtual testbed that simulates the 
processes of the real network environment, where a star topology 
is created with hosts and servers connected to the OpenFlow 
OVS-switch. Signature-based Snort IDS is deployed for traffic 
monitoring and attack detection, by mirroring the traffic destine 
to the servers. The vulnerability assessment shows possible attacks 
threat exist in the network architecture and effectively contain by 
Snort IDS except for the few which the suggestion is made for 
possible mitigation. In order to provide scalable threat detection in 
the architecture, a flow-based IDS model is developed. A 
flow-based anomaly detection is implemented with machine 
learning to overcome the limitation of signature-based IDS. The 
results show positive improvement for detection of almost all the 
possible attacks in SDN environment with our pattern recognition 
of neural network for machine learning using our trained model 
with over 97% accuracy.  
Keywords — Software-defined Network; Intrusion Detection 
System; OpenFlow; Machine Learning; Neural Network; 
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging area 
that promises to change the way we design, build, and operate 
the networks. Shifting from the traditional network architecture 
of proprietary based to the open, simple, and programmable 
network architecture. Open networking foundation defines 
SDN as “an evolving architecture that is dynamic, manageable, 
cost-effective, and adaptable. An ideal for the high bandwidth 
requirement and dynamic nature of today's application. The 
architecture decouples the network control and forwarding 
functions. This is enabling the network control to become 
directly programmable, and allowing the underlying 
infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network 
services” [1]. 
Today network has become an essential part of public 
infrastructures with the inception of public and private cloud 
computing. The traditional networking approach has become 
too complex. This complexity has resulted in a barrier for 
creating new and innovative services within a single data center, 
difficulties in interconnecting data centers, interconnection 
within enterprises, and bigger barrier in the continued growth of 
the Internet in general. 
Furthermore, current network architecture has many 
limitations, which were resolved with the emergence of new 
SDN architecture. These include but are not limited to: inability 
to optimize network for WAN and Data Centre to generate more 
revenue and reduce expenses. With SDN more revenue can be 
generated by monitoring network devices and optimizing 
device utilization with a dynamic feature of SDN. The increase 
in capital and operational cost with SDN automation reduces 
human involvement in managing resources to a minimum which 
significantly reduces the cost. 
The SDN comprise three-tiered architecture that is designed 
to simplify network management [2]: • The Application layer: contains application that delivers
services.• The SDN Controller: the main decision-making component
separated originally from data plane which facilitates
automated network management.• The Infrastructure layer: a hardware layer that requires
command line interface (CLI), but it does not need a
programming language, unlike other layers.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The key technology advantages of SDN are network 
flexibility, efficiency, speedy service provisioning, and lower 
operation cost considering the gain over the traditional network 
technology. Traditional network technologies are proprietary 
and restricted to specific devices. SDN has the ability of been 
programmable, configurable and manageable. It is also open for 
the user to use devices from different vendors. SDN architecture 
is characterized by the separation of the control plane from data 
plane [2]. With the logically centralized control plane, the 
controller has the global view of the entire network where the 
forwarding entries are programmed based on the policies 
defined. This centralization can result in efficient support for 
traffic engineering, and maintain reliable security and policy 
implementation to the entire network [3].  
Despite the security consideration in designing SDN 
architecture, the SDN environment still has security issues that 
need to be addressed. Some of these problems are inherited 
from traditional network environment, while some are specific 
to the SDN architecture [3]. 
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 The security threat has become so frequent from within, the 
effect of these attacks ranges from mild to critical. The security 
breach usually alters the credibility, integrity, or availability of 
hardware, software or an information resource. The attack on 
these components can bring considerable damage to the 
organization. The damages can be a loss in monetary or 
reputation which may lead to the total or partial collapse of the 
organization. Therefore, an effective measure must be put in 
place to avoid the damage. 
Although the architecture of SDN tried to contain the security 
prone in the network management, but the separation of the 
control plane from data plane bring another form of security 
threat to the SDN architecture that can be found in any of it three 
layers: application, control, and infrastructure layer. The 
consequences this security prone can lead to data modification, 
unauthorized access to the network, data leakage, denial of 
service (DoS) [4]. Many of the attacks are possible due to the 
centralized control introduced by the SDN architecture. In [5] 
demonstrated the possibility of an attack gaining access to the 
SDN controller. Once the controller is compromised the 
attacker can alter the rules in the devices and deny a legitimate 
user access to the available resources (DoS attack). DoS attacks 
are not the only attacks for SDN but among the common attacks 
there are other attacks like port proves, vulnerability scan, 
man-in-the-middle (MITM), and side-channel.  
Integrating an intrusion detection system (IDS) into SDN 
architecture is potentially one of the best approaches to build a 
secure SDN environment. IDS is a system purposely designed 
to detect and alert unauthorized or unwanted access attempts, 
changes, or/and restricts computer system resources [6]. The 
system typically detects malicious traffic and attack against the 
network or a single host computer.  
Basically, there are two most common types of IDS: host IDS 
(HIDS) and network IDS (NIDS). HIDS is usually installed and 
run on each system or network as individual device monitoring 
the incoming and outgoing packet within the system or network 
and notifies the user or administrator if the system is under any 
potential or actual attack or any unusual activities detected. 
HIDS normally operates by taking the snapshot of the existing 
files and compares it with the previous snapshot of system files, 
with this the unauthorized activities can be identified. 
On the other hand, NIDS is a system that identifies 
unauthorized, anomalous behavior, and attack in the network by 
examining network traffic and monitoring different hosts over 
the network environment. NIDS generally gain access to the 
network traffic by linking to a hub, network tap, and configured 
switch for port mirroring. In this work, the purpose is to 
implement IDS for SDN environment, therefore IDS in this 
work refers to the NIDS throughout the project unless it is 
specified otherwise. 
In this work, we used signature-based detection technique 
and Snort in specific to implement IDS for SDN. We also 
develop flow-based IDS model that can provide scalable 
security and threat management solution using pattern 
recognition of neural network with machine learning. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Signature-based IDS 
III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
A virtual testbed is developed where various attacks are 
performed by means of simulation. Initially, different attacks 
techniques are implemented to observe the impact of DoS, 
Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks on SDN environment on both the 
servers and normal users accessing resources on the server. 
As signature-based IDS cannot be the solution to all type of 
attacks, it is necessary to provide alternative approaches that 
complement its work. A flow-based anomaly-based system is 
developed as an anomaly-based IDS. This is due to the nature 
OpenFlow protocol as the communication protocol between 
controller and infrastructure layer: it uses flow for identifying 
the network traffic, and also records its information by counters. 
The flow is a sequence of IP packets with common 
characteristics, going through monitoring point within a period 
of time.  
The work follows two approaches to provide a solution to this 
problem. The first is developing a virtual testbed that mimics 
the real scenario and provides a solution to signature-based 
attacks. The second method is designing the model that will 
provide anomaly-based detection. This would be integrated into 
signature-based architecture for detection of unknown attack 
undetected by signature-based IDS. 
A. Virtual Testbed 
OpenDayLight controller (ODL) is installed and configured 
on Ubuntu Desktop 16.04 OS. ODL manages the Open Virtual 
Switches (OVS) based on OpenFlow protocol through a remote 
connection to be established by Mininet simulator.  
 The Mininet network simulator is also installed and 
configured to create host system, servers, and OVS on the same 
OS with ODL. The Metasploitable2 server is hosting four 
services that are left vulnerable intentionally for penetration 
testing purpose, while the Parrot security will be generating 
attack scenario on Metasploitable2.   
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 Furthermore, Snort IDS is installed and configured on 
separate Ubuntu Desktop VM to provide network traffic 
monitoring, attacks intrusion detection by means of NIDS. 
The Mininet+ODL deployed on VM with three additional 
interfaces eth1, eth2 and eth3, these are used by Mininet switch 
s1. The three interfaces are configured with no IP addresses to 
enable the system to provide bridging between systems 
connecting to the s1 ovs-switch such as Parrot Security, 
Metasploitable2 server and Snort IDS.  
Parrot Security is deployed on the VM and installed, it has 
special attacking tools, the default eth0 will connect to the s1 
ovs-switch in the Mininet+ODL environment through eth1 
interface. The Parrot Security IP is configured to be in the same 
network with Metasploitable2 server. The Metasploitable2 
server is deployed on the VM as a server connecting to s1 
ovs-switch through eth2 interface of Mininet VM with it default 
eth0.   
Snort IDS is deployed on Ubuntu machine VM. The incoming 
and outgoing network traffic flow is monitored by the Snort by 
means of mirroring. The communication is made through 
OpenFlow switch created on Mininet machine via mirror traffic. 
Snort is connected to OpenFlow switch s1 by eth3. Figure 2 
present architecture of proposed IDS for SDN virtual testbed 
environment.  
 
Figure 2. Virtual Testbed Architecture 
 
B. Network Topology 
The star topology is used for setting up laboratory network 
because it is easy to setup looking at the nature of the research 
and the combination of systems involved. Also, OVS-switch as 
a central hub is expected to provide optimal performance of the 
network traffic without overhead in providing centralize 
network monitoring. Therefore, failure of a single node will not 
affect the entire network. 
Figure 3 presents four independent VMs as their configuration 
seen in Figure 2 the Mininet VM is centralized. Inside Mininet, 
a network is created with fifteen VM hosts, five generating 
malicious traffic internally using manual attack procedure by 
attacking the server and other internal external server hosts. The 
ten hosts VMs generate normal or benign traffic between each 
other and the servers. All the hosts VM are connected to 
OVS-switch.  
PENTMENU penetration testing tool is installed on both 
Parrot Security and Mininet+ODL machine with aim of attacks 
demonstration using created hosts for internal attacks.  
The Wireshark services is on installed Mininet Simulator 
lunch, where the Wireshark will be monitoring the network 
traffic through the traffic filter any option. The purpose of using 
Wireshark is to observe MITM attacks on the controller. 
The connection between OpenFlow ovs-switch with ODL 
controller is remote when creating the topology, a remote 
connection is specified with the loopback IP address of Ubuntu 
machine where ODL controller is installed. The Parrot Security, 
Metasploitable2 server, and Snort IDS are connected to 
OpenFlow ovs-switch through the Mininet+ODL VM interface 
eth1, eth2 and eth3 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3. Signature-based Network Topology 
 
C. Pattern Recognition of Neural Network 
 
Figure 4. Flow-based IDS Model Network Topology 
 
In addition to the existing signature-based IDS, a Neural 
Network-based model is designed to be integrated into the 
system. This second method proposed in this work is 
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 flow-based anomaly detection using machine learning approach 
to compliment the signature-based, since the signature-based 
cannot detect the unknown or zero-day attack. Furthermore, 
attack demonstration on the virtual testbed is limited to specific 
type of attacks under each category of attack. Therefore, a 
model that can detect a wide number of attacks is proposed. 
The flow-based IDS model illustrates in Figure 4 will be 
implemented in the future, as a module using Restful API or 
Java and hosted over ODL controller. As an application layer 
model, the network policies of traffic flow is controlled by the 
application, in such a way that some rules will be imposed that 
will be responsible for attack detection.  
 Typically the flow statistic request is sent to the switch by the 
controller over a certain time interval. When the statistics are 
available on the controller, the module will used it to detect 
anomaly behavior in the flow. The detected anomaly traffic will 
be mitigated appropriately through flow modification, hence 
result in new network impose by the module IDS.     
Pattern recognition of neural network is implemented in this 
model. It usually classifies inputs into a set of target categories. 
The network architecture consists of three layers: an input layer, 
hidden layer, and an output layer.  Backpropagation algorithm is 
used to trained the network. 
Backpropagation algorithm is a training method used in 
classification by propagation and updating the weight of a 
network. When an input is received from the input layer, it is 
passed to the next layer, then to the output layer. The output is 
compared with the given targets or desired output, each output 
result of the neuron is calculated using a function and error 
value at the output layer. If the output matches the target or 
roughly closed, then it is presented as final output, otherwise an 
error is fired backwards from the output layer toward previous 
layers until desired output is obtained. 
 
Figure 5. Backpropagation Algorithm 
 
The Figure 5 illustrates the network architecture of 
backpropagation algorithm uses by the model. X is the input 
connected to the hidden layer W weights, also the same for 
hidden connected to the output layer. The input variables are 
transformed by the nonlinear activation function, the algorithm 
is expressed in the following equations [7]: U = ∑ �௝௜ + �௝଴  ௡௜=ଵ                 (1) V = ∑ �௞௝ +  �ℎܷ + �௞௢௠௝=ଵ             (2) �̂ = �௢ܸ                     (3) 
 
D. NSL-KDD Dataset for Training Model 
The NSL-KDD dataset is used in this research to implement 
training and evaluation of the proposed model. The NSL-KDD 
dataset is the refine version of KDD-Cup 99. KDD-Cup 99 
dataset is originally used in Knowledge Discovery and Data 
mining competition, it is the leading data mining competition in 
the world [8]. KDD-Cup 99 dataset has the problem of 
redundant record which may result in degrade the quality of 
inputs and cause learning algorithm to be biased to the more 
frequent record [9]. The NSL-KDD is proposed to solve this 
problem and made publicly available to the researchers. 
Although NSL-KDD has inherent some problem of KDD-Cup 
99 but the data is still used by many researchers [10, 11]. These 
can be a standard benchmark for comparing our model with 
another detection method.   
The work obtained the dataset from [12] which are partly 
pre-processed and categorize into four main categories: DOS, 
U2R, R2L, and Probes both composing the training and testing 
data. Table 1 illustrates categorization of the attacks based on 
four categories with type of attacks in both training and testing. 
The attacks in Testing set that are italic and bold are only 
introduce in the testing stage and not available at the time. The 
categorization of training and testing dataset is predetermined 
from the original dataset source, with objective of obtaining 
good results in real-time. The dataset has forty-two features 
together with target feature; all the features are in numerical 
values against some that are originally nominal in order to train 
our model. This conversion is made from the data source. 
 
Table 1. Attack Category 
Category Training Testing  
DoS back, land, 
Neptune 
pod, smurf, 
teardrop, 
 
apache2, back, land, 
mailbomb, Neptune 
pod, processtable, smurf, 
teardrop, 
udpstorm 
U2R Bufferoverflow, 
loadmodule, 
perl 
rootkit, 
 
Bufferoverflow, 
loadmodule, perl 
ps, rootkit, 
snmpguess, 
sqlattack,worm 
xterm 
R2L Spy, 
warezclient 
ftp_write, 
guesspasswd, 
imap, 
multihop, phf 
warezmaster 
 
Spy, warezclient 
ftp_write, 
guesspasswd, httptunnel, 
imap, 
multihop, named, 
phf, sendmail 
snmpgetattack, 
warezmaster,xlock 
xsnoop 
Probes Ipsweep, nmap, 
portsweep, 
satan 
Ipsweep, mscan, 
nmap, portsweep, 
saint, satan 
 
 To make the model more realistic and simplify real 
implementation of the module on ODL controller, specific 
features are selected which is commonly obtainable in the SDN 
environment. Seven features were selected from the existing 
forty-one features and illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Feature Selection 
Feature Description  
duration  Length (number of seconds) of the 
connection 
protocol_type Type of protocol such as TCP, UDP, etc. 
service  Network service on the destination, such as 
HTTP, telnet, ssh, etc. 
src_bytes Number of data bytes from source to 
destination 
dst_bytes Number of bytes from the destination to 
source 
count  Number of connections to the same host as 
the current connection in the past two 
seconds 
srv_count Number of connections to the same service as 
the current connection in the past two 
seconds 
E. Evaluation Matrix and Procedure 
In evaluating the performance of our proposed model, it is 
important to use a standard benchmark for evaluation criteria. 
Accuracy (ACC), Precision (P), Sensitivity (SNS), and 
F-Measure (F1-score) are commonly used parameters in 
performance evaluation criteria for NIDS models [10]. In this 
experiment, the specified parameters are used in evaluating the 
performance of our model. To achieve this we used the 
confusion matrix to calculate the parameters. Moreover, the 
confusion matrix contains the following parameters: True 
Positive (TP) number of attack record correctly identified, True 
Negative (TN) number of attack record correctly rejected, False 
Positive (FP) number of attack record incorrectly identified, and 
False Negative (FN) number of attack record incorrectly 
rejected. The following equation derived from confusion matrix 
to obtain our evaluation parameters [11]. 
 Accuracy (ACC): measures the percentage of true detection 
over the total traffic trace.  
 ACC = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN                    (4)  
 
Sensitivity (SNS): also call recall or true positive rate 
measures the percentage of predicted attacks against all the 
attacks presented.  
 SNS = TPTP+FN                        (5)  
 
Precision (P): measures the number of attacks predicted by 
IDS that are actual attacks.  
 P = TPTP+ FP                     (6)  
 
F-Measure (F1): is a measure of test accuracy in the model by 
considering Precision and Sensitivity.  
 F1 = ଶTPଶTP+FP+FN                (7) 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Figure 6. Performance Measurement Graph 
 
 
Figure 7. Accuracy measure from Confusion Matrix 
 
The performance of the model validation is best on 0.098137 
at 107 iterations as shown in Figure 6. The algorithm normally 
stops training when the performance of the training data stops 
improving, by doing that the best number of an epoch is 
 selected. The validation set is used to measure this performance 
because of its ability to generalize network model and serve as 
the basis for the evaluation. 
The Performance Measurement Graph Figure 6 illustrates the 
results obtained for the performance evaluation of the designed 
IDS model using confusion matrix (Figure 7). The model shows 
high detection accuracy of 97.4% in detecting attacks with 
training set and 97% on testing set, while overall accuracy is 
97.4%. The Figure 8 shows model performance on the dataset 
on graph of True Positive rate (sensitivity) and False Positive 
rate (specificity), ROC curve is a plot on Sensitivity against 
Specificity, for the three portions of data on the training set the 
curve. The overall ROC formed a curve on the upper-left corner 
of the graph and this shows the optimal performance of the 
model at that point. Forming curve at the upper-left corner 
indicate the performance of model prediction is very good.  
Figure 8. ROC Curve 
A. Evaluation 
The performance of this model IDS is evaluated based on 
other neural network type such as Curve Fitting and Time 
Series. The results shown in Table 3 indicate Pattern 
Recognition has better performance accuracy of detecting 
anomaly with 97.3% detection rate. Fitting Curve has 89.5% 
accuracy, it initially has less performance but with weight 
initialization and re-training the performance in detection 
accuracy is improved. Moreover, Time Series Neural Network 
method recorded the poorest result, it takes longer time in 
training, this also makes retraining very difficult. During the 
training, it takes at least have an hour to complete training, 
hence retrain in several times is difficult.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of Neural Network  
Performance Accuracy 
Neural Network Type Detection Accuracy (%) 
Fitting Curve 89.5 
Pattern Recognition 97.3 
Time Series 33 
V. CONCLUSION 
Software Defined Networks as an emerging technology bring 
innovation into the networking, with decoupling of control 
plane and the data plane, removing proprietary in the network 
architecture to open and programmable network. Due to the 
numerous advantage of this architecture, many companies are 
shifting from the traditional network architecture to new SDN 
architecture. However, SDN as a new technology has arising 
issues that pose a challenge to the futuret of the technology. 
Security is one of the main issue that threatens the future of 
SDN technology.  
The paper present machine learning (Neural Network) based 
intrusion detection for SDN. The model IDS are built on the 
existing signature-based IDS architecture as flow-based IDS to 
detect anomaly-based attacks in the SDN environment. The 
Pattern Recognition is used in this paper due to its performance 
accuracy rate as compared with the other type of neural network 
model. 
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